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1. Introduction
In a recent report, the OECD (2008) esti-mates that, depending on the countries 
and time periods considered, 20 to 50 per-
cent of immigrants leave the host country 
within the first five years after arrival. In 
2011,  foreign-born outflows stood at a ratio 
of 21 percent to the inflow of migrants to 
Australia; 41 percent, 64 percent, and 76 
percent to the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and Spain; and 71 percent and 87 percent to 
The Republic of Korea and Japan, respec-
tively (OECD 2013). For the United States, 
an estimated 2.1 million  foreign-born indi-
viduals emigrated between 2000 and 2010 
(Bhaskar,  Arenas-Germosén, and Dick 
2013). 
We illustrate the temporariness of migra-
tions in figure 1 using combined evidence 
from existing academic studies. Specifically, 
the figure plots the fraction of immigrants 
who leave the host country against the 
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time since immigration for two groups of 
 destination countries: Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, and the United States—all 
typically viewed as traditional immigration 
countries—and Europe. The graph reveals 
three interesting details. First, immigrant 
out-migration rates are substantial and 
larger from European destination countries 
than from the more traditional immigration 
countries. Second, ten years after arrival, 
close to 50 percent of the original arrival 
cohort has left the destination country in the 
case of Europe and 20 percent in the case 
of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the 
United States. Third, out-migration rates are 
highest during the first decade and then level 
out. Overall, therefore, the figure empha-
sizes the  nonpermanence of many migra-
tions. This fact, although stressed by some 
authors long ago (e.g., Piore 1979; Massey 
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Figure 1. Estimated Outmigration Rates by Host Region
Notes: If estimates refer to the fraction of migrants who entered within a time interval and have left by the end 
of that interval (as in Bratsberg et al. 2007), the year of immigration is approximated by the interval midpoint, 
a choice likely to somewhat overestimate emigration rates given that remigration propensities are generally 
higher during the early postimmigration years. The exact numbers used are available upon request.
Sources: The figure is based on estimates taken from Ahmed and Robinson (1994); Alders and Nicolaas 
(2003); Aydemir and Robinson (2008); Beaujot and Rappak (1989); Bijwaard (2004); Bijwaard, Schluter, and 
Wahba (2014); Böhning (1984); Borjas and Bratsberg (1996); Bratsberg, Raaum, and Sorlie (2007); Dustmann 
and Weiss (2007); Edin, LaLonde, and Åslund (2000); Klinthäll (1999); Lukomskyj and Richards (1986); 
Michalowski (1991); Nicolaas and Sprangers (2004); OECD (2008); Rendall and Ball (2004); Shorland (2006); 
and Warren and Peck (1980).
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1987; see also our more detailed overview in 
section 2), has been—and still is—ignored 
in parts by the empirical literature on immi-
grant economic behavior. 
How important, then, is it to consider 
migration temporariness when analyzing 
various aspects of immigrant economic 
behavior? We answer this question using the 
example of a Polish immigrant who arrived 
in the United Kingdom in May 2004, the 
month in which Poland joined the European 
Union and the United Kingdom allowed 
Polish workers free access to its labor mar-
ket. At that time, the average wage in Poland 
was 17 percent of the average nominal wage 
in the United Kingdom (40 percent in real 
terms).1 We now consider the same migrant 
in two scenarios: In the first, the migration is 
permanent and the migrant remains in the 
United Kingdom for the remainder of her 
life. In the second, the migration is tempo-
rary and she plans to return home after three 
years. The individual’s behavior under the 
two scenarios (modeled in section 3) will be 
distinctly different. Under the temporary 
scenario, the large wage differential between 
the two countries motivates the migrant to 
work hard during the three years of planned 
stay and enjoy leisure later in life, while 
under the permanent scenario, the migrant 
will spread consumption of leisure more 
equally over the life cycle. Similarly, under 
the temporary scenario, she will typically 
have a lower reservation wage and accept 
jobs that would not be acceptable if immi-
gration were permanent. She will also be less 
willing to invest in human capital that is spe-
cific to the United Kingdom (e.g., language 
proficiency) but may save more and/or remit 
more. Hence, as this simple example illus-
trates, migration temporariness may imply 
important shifts in immigrant behavior and 
choices. 
1 http://stats.oecd.org/ (accessed 12.01.2015). 
The temporariness of migration thus has 
important implications for the modeling and 
empirical assessment of immigrants’ eco-
nomic behavior, especially given that migra-
tion plans are endogenous to many core 
economic variables, as the following example 
shows. Figure 2, panel A uses data from the 
US New Immigrant Survey (NIS) to break 
out the fraction of working-age immigrants 
reporting an intention to stay permanently by 
years of schooling.2 Figure 2, panel B, based 
on data from the German  Socio-economic 
Panel (SOEP), shows the same pattern for 
immigrants to Germany. These profiles sug-
gest that immigrants’ plans to return differ 
along the distribution of  premigration edu-
cation, albeit in a nonlinear (here inverse 
 U-shaped) way. Thus, if ignoring temporar-
iness of migrations, differences in behavior 
that are due to different expected migration 
durations may erroneously be associated 
with different  premigration education. 
If these intentions translate into actual 
behavior, then one obvious consequence 
is that out-migration may lead to selection, 
which would affect estimations of immi-
grants’ assimilation profiles. There is a lit-
erature that investigates the effects such 
selection has on the estimation of earnings 
profiles of immigrants (see e.g., Lubotsky 
2007; Dustmann and Görlach 2015, pro-
vide an assessment and survey of that lit-
erature). That literature, however, does 
usually assume that selective  out-migration 
is independent of economic behavior, and 
disregards the effect return plans may have 
on economic behavior of migrants. Rather 
than treating economic outcomes as exoge-
nous with respect to  remigration plans, we 
focus in this paper on the implications that 
different migration plans have for economic 
choices and outcomes, such as employment, 
2 The New Immigrant Survey only samples new legal 
immigrants to the United States, and is therefore not rep-
resentative for the entire immigrant population. 
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wages and savings. Since these choices are 
determined by anticipated  remigration plans 
(rather than  ex post realizations), we con-
sider immigrants as permanent or temporary 
depending on their intended migration dura-
tions at any given point in time.
If the intended return itself affects choices 
such as immigrants’ labor force participation 
and human-capital investment decisions, 
then this introduces additional complexi-
ties into the estimations of career profiles or 
other types of behavior over and above those 
instigated by selective out-migration. We 
illustrate what we view as some of the core 
channels generating these complexities in 
figure 3. For  nonmigrants or for permanent 
migrants, economic modeling usually consid-
ers only the relationship between economic 
choices, individual heterogeneity, and eco-
nomic conditions in one location, as in the 
dotted circle. However, when immigrants 
expect to return to their home countries, 
then this will lead to migrants’ behavior over 
their life cycles being affected by (expected) 
economic conditions in their home country 
environment, as well. The key element that 
links economic circumstances in the home 
country and economic choices of migrants 
in the host country is the intention of the 
migrant to  remigrate at a later stage, and to 
spend part of his or her life cycle in the home 
country (or, in more complex settings, in a 
third country).3 Obviously, researchers have 
to make choices about which economic deci-
sions to model and which sources of shocks 
and heterogeneity to consider, depending on 
the research question to be addressed. We 
will discuss some of these below. 
It should be noted that a permanent migra-
tion is not always just an extreme case of a 
temporary migration. Consider, for instance, 
3 In the case of undocumented migration or if a per-
manent residence is not granted, a return may not be 
voluntary, but forced upon the immigrant. The risk of 
being deported will be taken into account when economic 
choices are made, leading to these choices being affected 
in a similar way to immigrants who chose their return 
 optimally. See also section 3.4.7. 
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Notes: Fraction intending to stay permanently by level of schooling: (a) legal immigrants in the United States 
aged 18–64 who arrived at age 16 or older; (b) immigrants in Germany aged 18–64 who arrived at age 16 or 
older. Gray lines show the 95 percent confidence bounds of the fitted local polynomial regression line.
Sources: New Immigrant Survey (2003/2004); Socio-economic Panel, 2000–2012. 
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the case where skills that have a high return 
in the country of origin can be accumulated 
faster abroad. Many student migrations fit 
that scenario. While if faced with the choice 
between staying in their home country and 
a permanent settlement abroad, it may be 
that individuals choose the former, but they 
may still find it optimal to migrate tempo-
rarily to accumulate skills that are highly 
valued in their home country. Hence, while 
in some cases a permanent migration can 
simply be considered as a corner solution of 
an  individual’s choice of optimal  migration 
 duration, in other cases, a temporary migra-
tion is a conceptually different form of 
migration. 
The first important question is why migra-
tion temporariness has received so little 
attention despite potentially having major 
consequences for the analysis of immigrant 
behavior. We attribute this lack of attention 
primarily to the poor quality of available 
data. We therefore begin by discussing the 
advances enabled by better datasets and the 
possibilities for linking administrative and 
survey information across national  borders. 
Permanent migration
Host country (HC)
conditions
Individual
heterogeneity
Intention to 
remigrate
Home country 
conditions
Economic choices
Consumption
Labor supply
HC investment
Remittances
Figure 3. Interdependencies of Economic Outcomes and Return Decisions
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We also summarize the key papers that 
advance the availability of these higher qual-
ity data. 
We then consider the individual immi-
grant’s decision on the optimal length of a 
migration. To do so, we set out a simple flexi-
ble model framework with which to examine 
the various motives for why a migration may 
be temporary, rather than permanent, and 
illustrate the possible impact of this decision 
on certain behaviors, such as savings. We also 
use this framework to review the extant lit-
erature. Having provided insights into why 
temporary migration may be chosen, we 
then extend this framework in various direc-
tions. First, we outline the different forms of 
temporary migrations—including repeat or 
circular migrations, undocumented migra-
tions, student migrations, and guest worker 
migrations—and how these forms could be 
modeled using extensions of our modeling 
framework. Second, we consider the possi-
bility that temporary migration decisions are 
made not by an individual, but rather by a 
 nonunitary household, and briefly summa-
rize some of the papers that take such an 
approach. Third, we touch on the various 
research areas of migration economics and 
how taking migration temporariness into 
account changes the way analyses are con-
ducted, thereby possibly influencing a range 
of econometric estimates. Finally, we briefly 
discuss the consequences of temporary 
migration not only for the migrants and their 
families, but also for residents in the receiv-
ing and sending countries.
2. Migration Temporariness: Data and 
Measurement
The fact that migration temporariness has 
been so persistently ignored in the empirical 
literature is largely related to the inability to 
measure it. That is, although it is common 
to register newly arrived immigrants, it is far 
less common—and often not even feasible—
to measure out-migration. Hence, assessing 
the degree to which immigrants may later 
leave the country of destination is challeng-
ing. Nevertheless, recent advances have been 
made in this area, partly by combining multi-
ple data sources, but also by adding items on 
emigration plans into survey questionnaires.
One useful illustration of the importance 
of measurement when trying to capture the 
degree of out-migration is the estimation of 
the fraction of immigrants who, during the 
nineteenth century Age of Mass Migration, 
arrived in the United States and then left 
again. That assessment has changed consid-
erably with the availability of better data and 
the ability to process large data files using 
advanced computer technology. For exam-
ple, one early assessment by  Mayo-Smith 
(1893), which relied on passenger data from 
the principal shipping lines, estimated that 
about 16 percent of immigrants who arrived 
in the United States between 1881 and 1890 
left again. Nearly 40 years later, Willcox 
(1931), using official emigration records for 
 1908–1914 and earlier immigration statistics, 
estimated that, assuming a constant ratio of 
net to gross immigration for  1900–1910, the 
ratio of departures to arrivals of  foreign-born 
individuals was about 39 percent. Kuznets 
and Rubin (1954) refined this estimation 
by performing similar but separate extrapo-
lations for males and females and obtained 
a ratio of 45 percent. A recent paper by 
Bandiera, Rasul, and Viarengo (2013), in 
contrast, by combining records on all immi-
grants arriving at Ellis Island between 1892 
and 1924 with census data from 1900, 1910, 
and 1920, estimates out-migration rates from 
the United States to have been around 60 per-
cent for the  1900–1910 decade and around 
75 percent for the  1910–1920 decade. Each 
of these out-migration estimations relies on 
more comprehensive and better data. 
Not only was out-migration an important 
part of US history in the nineteenth century, 
but more recent migrations are also likely 
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to have been, to a large extent, temporary. 
For instance, Warren and Peck (1980), using 
1960 and 1970 US census data and INS data 
on immigrants admitted to permanent resi-
dency within that decade, estimate that more 
than one out of every six immigrants admitted 
during the 1960s emigrated by the end of the 
decade. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1982), in con-
trast, using combined administrative and sur-
vey data to compute lower and upper bounds 
on emigration rates by 1979 for immigrants 
who arrived in 1971 from various nations, esti-
mate that the overall emigration rate for the 
entire cohort during those eight years could 
have been as high as 50 percent. Nevertheless, 
they do find considerable variation by ori-
gin country. Moreover, Borjas and Bratsberg 
(1996) estimate that of the two million legal 
immigrants who arrived in the United States 
between 1970 and 1974, only 1.6 million 
were counted in the 1980 census, implying an 
out-migration rate of 21.5 percent. Of the 2.6 
million immigrants who arrived between 1975 
and 1980, about 2.1 million were counted by 
the 1980 census, implying an out-migration 
rate of 17.5 percent. For the 1980s, Ahmed 
and Robinson, using census data and life table 
survival rates, estimate that of the  1980–1990 
immigrants to the United States, 8 percent left 
again during the same decade, and of immi-
grants included in the 1980 census who had 
arrived during the previous decade, 19 per-
cent had emigrated again by 1990. In more 
recent estimates, Bhaskar,  Arenas-Germosen, 
and Dick (2013) calculate that about 14 per-
cent of immigrants who arrived during the 
1990s and were recorded in the 2000 cen-
sus had left by 2010. It should be noted that 
these last two estimates refer to out-migra-
tion rates conditional on having stayed until 
the 1980 and 2000 census dates, respectively. 
Given that most out-migration occurs during 
the first few years after arrival (see figure 1), 
these figures are likely to underestimate the 
overall emigration rate of the initial arrival 
cohorts.
Over the past two decades, much progress 
has been made in migration assessment, with 
improvements occurring on several different 
fronts and resulting in different approaches 
to measure temporariness of migrations. We 
display the different types of data products 
that exist and allow assessment of temporar-
iness in table 1, where we also provide some 
examples of data sets. We now discuss these 
in detail.
First, data collection by survey now 
frequently permits assessment of migra-
tion temporariness from particular source 
regions, and the results have been used to 
evaluate such aspects as returnees’ pro-
pensity to be  self-employed or to estimate 
the returns to having migrated. Dustmann 
and Kirchkamp (2002), for instance, evalu-
ate surveys of former Turkish immigrants 
to Germany who returned home and who 
retrospectively report their migration his-
tories in Germany. Similar survey data are 
used by Mesnard (2004) for Tunisia; de 
Coulon and Piracha (2005) and Piracha 
and Vadean (2010) for Albania; Collier, 
Piracha, and Randazzo (2011) for Algeria, 
Morocco, and Tunisia; and McCormick and 
Wahba (2001, 2003) and Wahba and Zenou 
(2012) for Egypt. Another valuable source 
of retrospective migration histories is the 
Mexican Migration Project (MMP), which 
has been widely used in both the socio-
logical (e.g., Massey, Durand, and Malone 
2002; Massey and Gentsch 2014) and eco-
nomic literature (e.g., Deléchat 2001; 
Rendon and Cuecuecha 2010; Angelucci 
2012; and Reinhold and Thom 2013). Other 
Mexican datasets that contain information 
on previous migration experience include 
the Mexican census used by Chiquiar and 
Hanson (2005) and Lacuesta (2010) in their 
analyses of  emigrant selection, and the 
Mexican Family Life Survey used by Gitter, 
Gitter, and Southgate (2008) in their study 
of past migration experience’s effect on 
employment in Mexico after return.
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Second, the availability of comprehensive 
administrative datasets covering entire pop-
ulations, and that record arrival and depar-
ture of immigrants, has allowed precise 
assessment of the temporariness of migra-
tions for some countries. There are two 
 prerequisites for such measurement: First, 
not only must such administrative or register 
data be made available, but they tend to be 
useful only when matched with other data-
sets containing additional variables. Second, 
procedures must be in place that record the 
immigrants’ length of residence or departure 
date, which is not the case for every country. 
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and 
Australia, in particular, have been at the fore-
front of developing such administrative data 
sets, which are used to advantage in Edin, 
LaLonde, and Åslund (2000) and Nekby 
(2006) for Sweden; Bratsberg Raaum and 
Sørlie (2007) for Norway; Sarvimäki (2011) 
for Finland; Bijwaard, Schluter, and Wahba 
(2014) and Bijwaard and Wahba (2014) 
for the Netherlands; and  Cobb-Clark and 
Stillman (2013) for Australia. Some of the 
register datasets, especially, contain not only 
the date of exit, but also information about 
the destination country. For instance, Nekby 
(2006) and Bratsberg, Raaum, and Sorlie 
(2007) use register data from Sweden and 
Norway,  respectively, which include infor-
mation on year of emigration, destination, 
and the migration history to and from these 
countries backwards in time. Nekby then 
TABLE 1 
Types of Datasets Available to Research on Temporary Migration
Data type Dataset examples Examples of studies using these datasets
Source country survey 
data
Egyptian Labour Force Sample 
Survey (LFSS) 
McCormick and Wahba (2001, 2003); Wahba 
and Zenou (2012)
Mexican Migration Project (MMP) Deléchat (2001); Rendon and Cuecuecha 
(2010); Angelucci (2012); Reinhold and 
Thom (2013)
Destination country 
survey
German Socio-economic Panel 
(GSOEP)
Dustmann (2003); Bellemare (2007); van 
Baalen and Müller (2008); Kırdar (2012)
Administrative destina-
tion country data
Dutch Central Register Foreigners 
( Centraal Register Vreemdelingen, 
CRV)
Bijwaard et al. (2014), Bijwaard and Wahba 
(2014)
Finnish register data Sarvimäki (2011)
Norwegian register data Bratsberg et al. (2007)
Swedish register data Nekby (2006)
Matched  origin–desti-
nation data
Matched Finnish–Swedish population 
registers
Rooth and Saarela (2007)
Linked administrative 
and survey data in des-
tination countries
US Social Security records linked to 
the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) and to the 
Current Population Survey
Lubotsky (2007)
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links this migration information to additional 
data from Statistics Sweden that provides 
such information as labor-market outcomes. 
Third, data collection has also been 
advanced by a number of recent  initiatives 
that combine  microdatasets (such as admin-
istrative or census information) across 
different countries, which allows precise 
measurement of migrations across national 
borders. Again, Scandinavian countries are 
at the forefront of these efforts. Rooth and 
Saarela (2007), for instance, link Finnish and 
Swedish population registers to investigate 
emigrant and returnee selection, using birth 
date, sex, municipality of residence, and year 
of migration to match over 85 percent of 
Finns who migrated to Sweden after 1970 
and who lived there in 1990. Such efforts 
to merge administrative data across national 
borders extend also to historical data, 
although such mergers are constrained by 
the availability of particular variables without 
which they are infeasible. All too often, for 
example, the required information becomes 
available only after a substantial period has 
passed, such as the practice of not making 
US census records publicly available until 72 
years after each decennial census. 
An example for the possibilities such 
merger allows for analysis of immi-
grants’ return pattern is a recent paper by 
Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson (2014). 
They match 10 percent of  foreign-born 
men residing in the United States in 1900 to 
records from the 1910 and 1920 censuses4 
and use the generated panel to evaluate 
selective  out-migration of immigrants. Based 
on a comparison of panel and  cross-sectional 
 estimates of earnings equations they con-
clude that immigrants at the lower end of 
the earnings distribution were more likely 
to leave. To further substantiate this, in 
4 Naturally, out-migration sets an upper limit to the frac-
tion that can be matched. The match rate for US born men 
is at 19 percent considerably higher. 
the working paper version of their paper 
(Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2012a), 
they take advantage of information from a 
supplement to the 1910 Norwegian census, 
which asked individuals who had migrated to 
the United States and returned to Norway, 
for their departure and return dates, as well 
as their occupations in America. This allows 
a direct comparison of the occupational 
distribution of Norwegian immigrants in 
the United States to those who are known 
to have returned to Norway. It confirms 
their hypothesis of negatively selective 
out-migration.5
Fourth, some recent initiatives link sur-
vey datasets to administrative data sources, a 
technique used by Hu (2000) and Lubotsky 
(2007) to construct  stock-based samples for 
the United States with which to estimate 
immigrants’ earnings profiles. Similar large-
scale projects are under way elsewhere. In 
Germany, for instance, data from a new 
immigrant sample has been released in 2014, 
which is based not only on a wide range of 
survey questions asked by the SOEP but 
includes a randomized subsample linked to 
administrative employment histories from 
the Institute of Employment Research 
(Brücker et al. 2014). 
Finally, one notable aspect of return 
migration, and one explored in much detail 
below, is that at any point in time, individ-
uals condition such decisions as how much 
to save or how much to invest in learning on 
their expected future duration in the host 
country. Although these expectations may 
deviate from realized migration durations 
because of uncertainties or access to new 
information over an individual’s migration 
history, they matter when modeling immi-
grant behavior because migrants will base 
5 See also the more detailed discussion on selection in 
initial and return migrations among Norwegian migrants 
to the United States in Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 
(2012b). 
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choices such as human-capital investment 
on current return migration plans, rather 
than the measured completed migration his-
tory. The SOEP is perhaps the best source of 
longitudinal data on intended length of stay, 
while the short-panel NIS (Jasso et al. 2006) 
and the  cross-sectional National Immigrant 
Survey (Reher and Requena 2009) offer sim-
ilar data on legal immigrants to the United 
States and Spain, respectively.6 
Temporary migrations may, however, take 
more complex forms than simple return 
migration, which poses additional challenges 
to measurement. For example, individuals 
may transit across different countries before 
settling in a final country or may repeat 
migrate, in the sense of only staying in the 
host country for a limited period before 
returning home and then migrating back at a 
later time. Many migrations in Europe are of 
this type, as are migrations between Mexico 
and the United States.7 This “circular migra-
tion” may create measurement problems 
as for instance in surveys, time since immi-
gration is often not clearly linked to a first 
or more recent arrival. One possible way to 
measure circular or transitory migrations 
is to combine administrative data sources 
across countries, or to draw on retrospec-
tive surveys such as the MMP. Constant and 
Zimmermann (2011) use information from 
the SOEP on household members who tem-
porarily leave Germany to assess the preva-
lence of circular migration. 
As is apparent, progress has been made in 
recent years on measuring migration tempo-
rariness and collecting information that fol-
lows migrants across different  destinations. 
Nevertheless, although such progress is 
encouraging and will certainly positively 
affect future research, challenges still remain 
6 Figure 2 is based on such expectations from the NIS 
and the SOEP. 
7 See Constant, Nottmeyer, and Zimmermann (2013) 
for a recent survey. 
in using such data for structured analysis. 
In the next section, therefore, we outline a 
framework for modeling temporary migra-
tions that is capable not only of encompass-
ing special cases from the literature, but of 
accommodating various extensions. 
3. Modeling Temporary Migrations
To better understand why migrants return 
to their home countries even when wages 
are persistently higher in the destination 
country and how migration temporariness 
affects migrant behavior, we develop a sim-
ple dynamic model that formulates the 
migrant’s decision problem as a dynamic pro-
gram. This provides a simple unified frame-
work that not only describes many motives 
for return migration discussed in the litera-
ture, but encompasses most of the models 
used therein. The exposition draws on ongo-
ing work by Adda, Dustmann, and Görlach 
(2015), where we formulate and estimate a 
structural dynamic discrete choice model 
of return migration and economic behavior. 
There are few similar models developed else-
where (e.g., Deléchat 2001; Colussi 2003; 
Bellemare 2007; van Baalen and Müller 
2008; Thom 2010; Rendon and Cuecuecha 
2010; Kırdar 2012; Lessem 2013; Nakajima 
2014a, 2014b; Girsberger 2015; and Görlach 
2016) that address aspects of temporary 
migration. Using this model, we first identify 
and graphically simulate the possible trig-
gers of temporary migration and then, while 
referencing pertinent studies, develop the 
implications of return plans for some eco-
nomic behaviors, including human-capital 
investment, labor supply, and savings. 
We focus on aspects of international migra-
tion, as do most of the studies to which we 
relate our discussion. However, the literature 
on internal movements is concerned with 
many similar issues. Much of this research 
analyses  rural–urban migration (see e.g., the 
classic papers by Sjaastad 1962, and Harris 
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and Todaro 1970), and—as the early litera-
ture on international migration—treats such 
movements as a permanent change of loca-
tion. More recent papers introduce tempo-
rariness, such as Morten (2013), who analyzes 
temporary migration as an insurance mech-
anism in rural areas in India. These papers 
restrict attention to choices between two 
locations, an origin and a destination, as does 
the model we formulate below. An extension 
to multiple locations is feasible, albeit com-
putationally demanding. Kennan and Walker 
(2011) estimate a model of internal mobility 
in the United States that allows for sequen-
tial moves based on income expectations in 
different locations. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there are no estimated structural mod-
els of international migration that allow for a 
choice among multiple foreign destinations, 
which may be due to the computational chal-
lenge, but also because of the data availability 
problems discussed previously, especially for 
 third-country destinations.8
3.1 A Theoretical Framework for Analyzing 
Migrant Choices
As shown in the previous sections, tem-
porary migrations are frequent—perhaps 
the rule rather than the exception. Hence, 
the literature over the last two decades 
has offered numerous explanations for 
migrant return even in the face of higher 
 earnings in the host country. Hill (1987) and 
8 Using survey data from Burkina Faso, Girsberger 
(2015) shows that migrants from rural areas sort into inter-
nal and international migration along education levels, 
with less educated individuals migrating to neighboring 
countries, rather than to urban centers. Bridging the lit-
eratures on internal and international migration, a number 
of studies investigate the location choice of immigrants 
within the destination country (see e.g., Bartel 1989, 
Kaushal and Kaestner 2010, and Kritz, Gurak, and Lee 
2011 for the United States; and Reher and Silvestre 2009, 
and Silvestre and Reher 2014 for Spain). Spatial concen-
tration of  conationals is found to be a major determinant of 
internal location choices, which in turn has been shown to 
be important for immigrants’ economic outcomes (Edin, 
Fredriksson, and Åslund 2003; Damm 2009). 
Djajic´ and Milbourne (1988), for exam-
ple, explain return migration in terms of 
 location-specific preferences. Dustmann 
(1995, 1997b, 2003) shows that further 
motives for a return migration are a high 
purchasing power of the host country’s cur-
rency in the migrant’s home economy and 
higher returns back in the home economy 
to human capital accumulated in the host 
country. Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002) 
also illustrate that a higher rate of return 
on  self-employment activities in the home 
country may trigger return migration, while 
Mesnard (2004) shows that return migra-
tion may be one way to overcome credit 
constraints. Dustmann, Fadlon, and Weiss 
(2011) further demonstrate that return 
migration can be induced by migration to 
“learning centers,” countries in which human 
capital that has a high value in the home 
country can be accumulated more quickly. 
We focus here on the individual’s 
 postmigration maximization problem, but 
extensions to the primary migration decision 
are straightforward. We also discuss exten-
sions to a family context with more than one 
decisionmaker. In our basic framework, indi-
viduals decide on consumption and optimal 
duration in the destination country, consid-
ering changes in earnings potential in both 
countries brought about by human-capital 
accumulation. This dynamic model of return 
migration, although simple, not only encom-
passes most of the return motives discussed 
above, but is flexible enough to accommodate 
a variety of extensions that capture different 
types of temporary migration, including cir-
cular (repeat) migrations.
3.2 Model Setup
To illustrate the motives for a temporary 
migration in a simple model of migrant 
optimization across consumption and 
location, we use  V L ( Ω a ) , with state space 
 Ω a =  {a, A, S} , to designate an individual’s 
value of being in country  L at age  a , where 
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A denotes the stock of assets and  S the 
 individual’s skills. Here,  L ∈ {d, o} , where  d 
and  o denote destination and origin country, 
respectively. Skills are accumulated accord-
ing to  S a =  S a−1 +  θ S L , where  θ S L ≥ 0 is the 
increase in the skill stock in every period, 
which may differ between countries. We 
further assume that human capital summa-
rizes individual skills in terms of produc-
tive capacity, which may also differ across 
countries according to parameter    α 1 L . Thus, 
human capital  H in location  L is given by 
 H L =  S  α 1 L  , which reflects the notion 
that  individuals may be able to enhance 
their human capital through migration. 
Accordingly, log real earnings in country L 
for an individual with skills S are given by
(1)  ln  Y L (S) =  y L (S) 
 =  α 0 L +  α 1 L ln S,    L ∈  {d, o} , 
where  α 0 L  is the log rental rate for human 
capital that immigrants receive in location 
L . Earnings can differ between countries 
either because the (log) rental rates  α 0 L dif-
fer (e.g., because of different technologies) 
or because the rates of return to skills  α 1 L 
differ (e.g., because of different industry 
structures and thus different skill demands).
Per period utility in the destination 
country is given by  u d (π, c) , where  c is con-
sumption and  π is a (positive) preference 
parameter that affects the marginal utility 
of consumption and captures the preference 
for the host relative to the home country. 
Utility in the country of origin is  u o (1, c) , 
with the preference parameter normalized 
to one;9 that is, an individual prefers con-
sumption at home whenever  π < 1 . The 
mechanisms driving return decisions can 
be illustrated using a  nonstochastic model, 
9 We assume that 
 ∂ u 
d  ___∂ π > 0, 
∂ u L  _∂ c > 0,   ∂ 
 2  u L  _∂  c 2  < 0   ∂ 
 2 u d  _∂ π ∂ c > 0 . 
which is why—for now—we abstract from 
randomness. Nevertheless, our setting can 
easily be  generalized to a situation in which, 
for instance,  π is subject to unforeseen 
shocks or  π changes over time if immigrants 
get accustomed to a host country, as in ratio-
nal addiction models (see e.g. Becker and 
Murphy 1988).
While in the host country, a migrant 
decides at the beginning of each period 
whether to return to the country of origin 
or to stay for at least one more period. The 
value function is thus given by 
 V( Ω a ) = max { V d ( Ω a ) , V o ( Ω a )} ,
with the value of being in the destination 
country expressed as 
  V d ( Ω a ) =  max c  u d (π, c) + β V ( Ω a+1 ) 
  s.t.  A a+1 ≤  (1 + r) A a +  Y d ( S a ) −  c a , 
where  r denotes the real interest rate,10 and 
consumption decisions are made conditional 
on the location choice at the beginning of the 
period. The law of motion for  S is specified 
as above.
Assuming for now that there are no mul-
tiple migration spells (i.e., being back in the 
country of origin is an absorbing state), the 
value of having returned to the country of 
origin is
  V o ( Ω a ) =  max c  u o (c) + β  V o ( Ω a+1 ) 
  s.t. x A a+1 ≤ (1 + r)x A a +  Y o ( S a ) −  c a , 
10 To abstract from the additional choice of the location 
where assets are held, we assume real interest rates in the 
countries of origin and destination to be equal. See section 
3.4.3 for a discussion of differential investment opportuni-
ties in the two locations. 
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where assets are converted by the real 
exchange rate  x to adjust for the  purchasing 
power of the host-country currency in the 
country of origin.  Y o (S) and  Y d (S) denote 
real income in the home and host coun-
try, respectively, each depending on accu-
mulated skills  S (see (1)), and adjusted by 
each country’s price level.11 The analysis 
below assumes that upon immigration, 
a =  a 0 , A =  A 0 , and  S =  S 0 . At the end of 
the individual’s time horizon,  T , his or her 
terminal value is assumed to be  V L (T, A, S) = 0 , for all levels of  A and  S , thus abstracting 
from any bequest motives.
In this model, the optimal migration dura-
tion is determined by comparing the value 
of staying in the host country,  V d ( Ω a ) , with 
the value of returning to the country of ori-
gin,  V o ( Ω a ) , in each period. Given optimal 
consumption choices in each of the previous 
periods, resulting in a stock of assets  A a and a 
skill level  S a accumulated by age  a , the indif-
ference condition is
 u d (π,  Y d ( S a ) +  (1 + r) A a −  A a+1 d ) 
  + β V (a + 1,  A a+1 d ,  S a +  θ S d) 
 =  u o ( Y o ( S a ) +  (1 + r) x A a − x A a+1 o ) 
  + β  V o (a + 1, x A a+1 o ,  S a +  θ S o) , 
where  A a+1 L results from the optimal con-
sumption decision at age  a given the location 
choice  L ∈ {d, o} .
When migration is interpreted as an 
investment decision (either in terms of finan-
cial assets or human capital), rearranging 
11 We assume constant, though possibly different, price 
levels in the two locations. An extension to differences in 
inflation rates is straightforward, though estimation of a 
stochastic version of the model would become computa-
tionally more demanding, as an additional state variable 
would have to be included. 
terms reveals that the choice is between a 
current utility gain from returning now and a 
future gain from staying for at least one more 
period:
(2)
  u o ( Y o ( S a ) +  (1 + r) x A a − x A a+1 o ) −  u d (π, Y d ( S a ) +  (1 + r) A a −  A a+1 d ) 
current utility gain from returning this period
 
 =  β [V (a + 1,  A a+1 d ,  S a + θ S d) −  V o (a + 1, x A a+1 o ,  S a + θ S o) ] . 
future gain from staying one more period
 
When preferences for consumption in either 
country are identical  (π = 1) , currencies 
do not differ in their purchasing power 
(x = 1) , and there is no skill accumulation 
 ( θ S d =  θ S o = 0) , migration occurs solely 
because of wage differentials. When 
wages are lower in the destination country 
 ( y o (S) >  y d (S) ) , the value of being in the 
country of origin is higher at all ages than in 
the destination country  ( V o ( Ω a ) >  V d ( Ω a ) ) , 
so individuals have no incentive to migrate 
in the first place. When wages are higher 
in the host country, however, the reverse is 
true. That is, the current utility gain from 
returning will be negative at all ages, while 
the future gain from staying will always be 
positive, except in the last period of the indi-
vidual’s time horizon, when it is zero, so the 
individual will never want to return. This 
scenario corresponds to the classic case in 
which migration, if it occurs, is considered 
permanent.
For different parameter constellations, 
however, this framework produces varying 
motives for temporary migration: (1) a high 
preference for consumption in the home 
country, while wages are higher in the host 
country; (2) a high purchasing power of the 
host-country currency in the country of ori-
gin; (3) an initially positive wage differential 
in the host country versus the country of ori-
gin, which reverses once sufficient human 
capital has been accumulated; and (4) a 
faster accumulation of human capital in the 
111Dustmann and Görlach: The Economics of Temporary Migrations
host country. We detail each of these return 
motives separately in the next section.
3.3 Reasons for Return Migration and 
Behavioral Implications
3.3.1 Preference for Consumption in the 
 Country of Origin
Individuals may have an incentive to 
return despite persistently higher earnings 
in the host country  ( y d ( S a ) >  y o ( S a ) , ∀  S a ) 
if the marginal utility of consumption in the 
country of origin is higher than that in the 
host country  (π < 1) . Continuing to assume 
that currencies do not differ in their purchas-
ing power  (x = 1) and no differences exist in 
human-capital accumulation  ( θ S d =  θ S o) , then 
individuals will migrate if initially  V d ( Ω  a 0  ) >  V o ( Ω  a 0  ) . The migration will be permanent 
if earnings in the host, relative to the home, 
country are high and/or if the marginal util-
ities of consumption are not too different 
across the two countries, so that the value 
of being in the host country exceeds that of 
being in the country of origin throughout 
a migrant’s lifetime. Apart from the corner 
solutions of no migration and permanent 
migration, there may also be an internal 
solution, where the values of being in the two 
locations intersect within an individual’s time 
horizon. Such a case is depicted in panel A 
of figure 4, in which the dashed line shows 
the instantaneous utility gain from returning 
at any given age (first term in (2)), while the 
solid line is the future gain from staying in 
the host country for at least one more period 
(second term in (2)).12 
12 In the simulations, we assume that  u o =  c 1/2 
and  u d = π c 1/2 . The parameter values common for all 
simulations are  r = 0.05, β = 1/ (1 + r) ,  T = 30,  A 0 = 0, 
 a 0 = 0 , and  S 0 = 2 . In the scenario of location depen-
dent preferences (depicted in figure 5 and panel A 
of figure 6), we set  x = 1,  θ S d =  θ S o = 0 ,  e  α 0 d  = 0.5, 
 e  α 0 o = 0.25,  α 1 d =  α 1 o = 0.3 , and  π = 0.75 ( π = 0.8 in the 
high preference asset profile). 
Intuitively, the  trade-off a migrant faces 
is that between a higher lifetime income 
(and higher consumption) from staying lon-
ger and the loss in foregone utility (inability 
to consume at home) from spending addi-
tional time in the host country. In the sce-
nario graphed in figure 4, the migrant would 
return to the country of origin at  a = 14 . The 
purpose of migration in this case would be 
the accumulation of assets in the host coun-
try in order to finance higher consumption 
after return to the country of origin where 
the marginal utility of consumption is higher. 
This motive for migration is the most com-
monly cited in the early economic literature 
on return migration (see, e.g., Hill 1987; 
Djajic´ and Milbourne 1988; Dustmann 
1995). 
The consumption and earnings profiles for 
this scenario are illustrated in panel B of fig-
ure 4. While in the country of destination, 
consumption is lower than earnings and the 
migrant accumulates savings; upon return, 
earnings drop because of lower wages in 
the country of origin, but consumption aug-
ments because of an increase in the marginal 
utility of consumption. Thus, migrants save 
while abroad and then  de-save back in the 
country of origin.13 
The pattern of asset accumulation is illus-
trated by the dashed line in panel A of fig-
ure 5. In the figure, we also illustrate asset 
accumulation for a migrant with all the same 
characteristics but a higher consumption 
utility in the host country,  π (depicted by the 
solid line in figure 5, panel A). There are two 
differences between this latter migrant and 
that depicted by the dashed line: first, he or 
she stays considerably longer; and second, 
although the overall stock of assets accumu-
lated during the migration is only slightly 
lower, the smaller difference in  marginal 
13 This point also has been made by Galor and Stark 
(1990), albeit in a model in which immigrants face an exog-
enous probability of return. 
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utilities from consumption in the countries 
of origin and destination induces much 
higher consumption and lower saving rates 
in the host country, as shown by the flatter 
asset accumulation profile.
3.3.2 High Purchasing Power of the 
 Host-Country Currency 
A second motive for temporary migration 
is that price levels in a migrant’s home coun-
try are lower because the destination coun-
try’s currency has a higher purchasing power 
there. In such a case, by migrating and sav-
ing while abroad, migrants may be able to 
increase their lifetime consumption through 
return migration even if earnings in the two 
countries are the same, in terms of purchas-
ing power in the respective countries. For 
example, a Polish migrant to the United 
Kingdom may be able to buy one restaurant 
meal for each hour worked in the United 
Kingdom and an identical restaurant meal in 
Poland for each hour worked in Poland, but 
when she spends the salary for one hour of 
work in the United Kingdom in Poland, she 
can afford two restaurant meals. This sce-
nario may characterize many migration sit-
uations, with price differentials, especially in 
the  nontraded goods sector. They may even 
extend to traded goods, if migrants have a 
high demand for goods produced in their 
countries of origin that must be shipped to 
their respective host countries and are thus 
more expensive than if purchased and con-
sumed in the country of origin.
To show how these differentials may gen-
erate return migrations, we again assume 
no differences in human-capital accumu-
lation  ( θ S d =  θ S o) and, as in the benchmark 
case, no locational preferences  (π = 1) . 
We further assume that wages (in terms 
of each country’s price level) are identical 
 ( y o (S) =  y d (S) ) . Supposing, however, that 
the currency in which host-country wages 
are paid has a higher purchasing power 
in the migrant’s country of origin  (x > 1) , 
the instantaneous cost of staying abroad 
increases because the migrant is prevented 
from consuming a larger bundle of goods 
in the country of origin. At the same time, 
because life is finite and due to a decreasing 
marginal utility of consumption, the future 
benefit also decreases. At the time of return, 
the migrant experiences an increase in his 
or her accumulated savings in real terms, as 
shown in panel B of figure 5, which depicts 
the asset paths for two different purchasing 
power parities.14
Similar to the above scenario, differences 
in purchasing power are compatible with 
the target saving behavior of temporary 
migrants. One important difference from 
the locational preferences scenario, how-
ever, is that a high purchasing power of the 
host-country currency alone can trigger a 
migration, despite the same earnings in the 
two countries. Nevertheless, it will not on its 
own induce permanent migration because 
the incentive to spend time abroad arises 
solely from the purchasing power of that 
currency in the country of origin. Thus, in 
this scenario, without earnings differences 
between the two countries, migrations will 
always be temporary. This can be seen by 
noticing that the instantaneous utility gain 
from returning at any age is positive, versus 
the zero future gain from staying in the last 
period of the individual’s time horizon. 
3.3.3 Temporarily Higher Earnings in 
 the Destination Country
Although we have so far abstracted from 
human-capital accumulation, this model 
offers two scenarios in which human-capital 
accumulation may make it worthwhile for an 
individual to migrate temporarily. In the first, 
which again assumes individual indifference 
to consumption in either location  (π = 1) and 
14 Here, we set  x = 1.5 ( x = 1.1 in the low  purchasing 
power asset profile),  θ S d =  θ S o = 0 ,  e  α 0 d  =  e  α 0 o = 0.5, 
 α 1 d =  α 1 o = 0.3 and  π = 1 . 
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no differences in either  currency’s  purchasing 
power  (x = 1) , human capital is accumulated 
at the same positive pace in both countries 
( θ S d =  θ S o > 0) . Assuming also that the rate 
of return for skills is higher in the origin 
country  ( α 1 o >  α 1 d) but that the log rental rate 
for human capital is higher in the destination 
country ( α 0 o <  α 0 d), then migration may be 
attractive because wages are initially higher 
abroad. As skills accumulate, however, return 
may become increasingly appealing because 
the new skill level raises the migrant’s human 
capital. This scenario may characterize a sit-
uation in which the advanced technology in 
the host country shifts the entire log wage 
distribution upwards, but the relative scar-
city of skills leads to higher skill returns in the 
home country, a situation implicitly assumed 
by Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) in their anal-
ysis of the selection of migrants from Mexico 
to the United States.
In this scenario, migration occurs if the 
initial wage differential, driven by high rental 
rates in the host country  α 0 d, is positive. If 
this initial wage differential is very large, the 
differences in returns to skills modest, or 
skill accumulation relatively slow, migration 
will be permanent. However, if differences 
in skill prices are large, migrations may be 
temporary because, at some point, the immi-
grant’s higher productivity potential in the 
origin country will overcompensate for the 
differences in rental rates. The earnings and 
consumption profiles in such an intermediate 
case with an interior solution are graphed in 
panel A of figure 6.15 Although skill accumu-
lation is the same in both locations, earnings 
increase more strongly after return because 
the returns to skill are higher in the coun-
try of origin  ( α 1 o >  α 1 d) . As earnings increase 
throughout the individual’s working life, the 
migrant will initially borrow and then repay 
15 The parameters in this case are set to  x = 1, 
 θ S d =  θ S o = 0.1 ,  e  α 0 d  = 0.5, e  α 0 o = 0.25,  α 1 d = 0.3,  α 1 o = 0.9, 
and  π = 1 . 
debt later in life. Nevertheless, the point at 
which he or she starts repaying debt need 
not coincide with the time of return (as is 
the case in panel A of figure 6) because in 
this scenario, both initial emigration and 
return are entirely driven by wage differen-
tials. Moreover, in contrast to the two pre-
vious cases, consumption will be perfectly 
smoothed because individuals are indiffer-
ent to consumption in either location and 
price levels do not differ across countries. 
It is also worth noting that here we have 
abstracted from individual heterogeneity. 
However, if individuals differed in their 
innitial skill endowments, then under this 
scenario, those who migrated would be neg-
atively selected from the overall population 
of the home country, and those who return 
migrated would be positively selected from 
the migrant population. This pattern corre-
sponds to the motivation for a return migra-
tion in Dustmann (1995) and Borjas and 
Bratsberg (1996) in which migrants increase 
their earnings potential in the country of 
origin after having spent some time in the 
United States. The other possible reason for 
return proposed by Borjas and Bratsberg is 
limited access to earnings information in the 
country of destination. The model discussed 
here can be extended to include this case by 
assuming that prior to immigration, individu-
als are unsure of either the earnings function 
parameters  α 0 d and  α 1 d or how successful they 
will be in skill accumulation in the country of 
destination,  θ S d.
3.3.4 Faster Accumulation of Skills in 
 the Destination Country 
A second case in which human capital can 
be a motive for a temporary migration is 
when skills can be accumulated more quickly 
in the destination country than in the origin 
country  ( θ S d >  θ S o) , a condition examined by 
Dustmann, Fadlon, and Weiss (2011) using 
a dynamic Roy (1951) model with different 
skill dimensions. This scenario is typified by 
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student migrations in which the knowledge 
acquired abroad is more valuable in the 
home country or migrations in which skills 
can be more easily accumulated in the work-
place in the destination country; for example, 
through the higher skill levels of  coworkers. 
To illustrate this case, we again assume 
that  x = 1 and  π = 1 and that although the 
rate of return to skills is higher in the ori-
gin country  ( α 1 o >  α 1 d) , the log rental rate 
for human capital is equal in both countries 
( α 0 o =  α 0 d) . As a result, earnings are always 
higher in the individual’s home country, and 
migration will typically not occur. There is, 
however, an incentive for temporary migra-
tion if skills can be accumulated more 
quickly in the destination country. Although 
seemingly similar to the previous situation 
in which wages are initially higher in the 
destination country, there is one important 
difference: just as when a disparity exists in 
currency purchasing power, a permanent 
migration will not occur because the sole 
purpose of migration is accumulation of an 
asset (in this case, human capital), which 
is of higher value for income generation in 
the origin than in the host country. As in the 
previous case, the instantaneous utility gain 
from returning increases with time in the 
host country because the migrant returns 
with a larger stock of skills that are valued 
more highly in the country of origin. The 
earnings and consumption paths for this sce-
nario are depicted in panel B of figure 6.16 At 
the time of return (here, at  a = 5 ), earnings 
exhibit a discontinuity because of the higher 
return to skills in the country of origin. 
Again, since income increases over the indi-
vidual’s lifetime, he or she initially borrows 
and, given the parameter values chosen, will 
start repaying only after having returned.
16 Here we let  x = 1,  θ S d = 0.2,  θ S o= 0.1 ,  α 0 d =  α 0 o= 0.5, 
 α 1 d = 0.3,  α 1 o = 0.9, and  π = 1 . 
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A combination of these two scenarios can 
help explain the observation in some empirical 
literature of positive (negative) returns in the 
origin country to having spent time abroad. 
Nevertheless, the evidence on such returns 
is mixed and suggests considerable hetero-
geneity in both the returns to skills and the 
rates at which skills are accumulated. Ramos 
(1992) and Enchautegui (1993), for example, 
find that Puerto Rican returnees from the US 
mainland, especially those who have stayed 
abroad for a long time, suffer penalties that 
individuals who never migrated do not. This 
situation corresponds to one in which skills 
are accumulated at a lower rate abroad or 
skills that are productive in the country of 
origin depreciated while the individual was 
abroad. Emigration and return in such a case 
may be driven by higher average wage levels 
on the US mainland. Lacuesta (2010), draw-
ing on Mexican census data, on the other 
hand reports that Mexican returnees from 
the United States do have higher earnings 
than  nonmigrants, which is more similar to 
the parameterization chosen above. He also 
finds, however, that this difference is already 
observable for returnees who have remained 
in the United States for less than a year and 
does not increase with length of migration. 
This latter points to a positive selection of 
emigrants from the origin country, rather than 
an accumulation of human capital. Contrary 
to Lacuesta (2010), who uses Mexican census 
data, Reinhold and Thom (2013) do find a 
significantly positive effect of longer migra-
tion durations in the United States on work-
ers’ wages after their return to Mexico, which 
they ascribe to the more continuous mea-
surement of lifetime migration experience by 
the Mexican Migration Project. Findings for 
other countries, however, are mixed: whereas 
Co, Gang, and Yun (2000) identify a posi-
tive wage premium for female returnees to 
Hungary from OECD countries, Barrett and 
O’Connell (2001) report a wage  premium for 
male, but not female, Irish returnees, and De 
Vreyer, Gubert, and Robilliard (2010) find 
significantly higher earnings for workers from 
a number of West African cities who have 
spent some time abroad. 
3.3.5 Discussion 
Whereas the above analysis isolated each 
return motive separately to illustrate the 
different reasons for return migration and 
their effects on consumption behavior and 
selection, in real migration situations, both 
emigration and remigration decisions are 
likely to be driven by a combination of these 
motives.17 Nevertheless, our analysis offers 
several interesting insights: First, differ-
ences in purchasing power can be a power-
ful motive for return migrations and, given 
differences in consumption preferences, can 
induce particular savings patterns that are 
commonly associated with temporary migra-
tions. Second, alternative highly plausible 
scenarios exist when a return is driven by dif-
ferential rental rates to human capital or dif-
ferent skill accumulation possibilities that can 
lead to situations of no savings accumulation 
in the host country. Third, two of the scenar-
ios outlined above create a situation in which 
a migration will only take place in conjunc-
tion with a return; in both cases, a  migration 
allows the individual to attain a higher level of 
lifetime consumption, in one case driven by 
price differences; in the other, by faster skill 
accumulation in the host  country. Temporary 
migrations, therefore, may be forms of 
17 In the above baseline model, the four scenarios dis-
cussed so far amount to necessary conditions. As pointed 
out in the discussion, however, depending on the actual 
parameter values, migration may not occur in the first 
place or may (in two of the scenarios) turn out to be per-
manent. Sufficiency for migrations to occur and be tempo-
rary requires an interior solution to indifference condition 
(2): that is, that initially  V o ( a 0 ,  A 0 ,  S 0 ) <  V d ( a 0 ,  A 0 ,  S 0 ) so 
that an individual finds it optimal to emigrate, while for 
a certain age  a ∈  { a 0 + 1,T} , the value of returning must 
exceed the value of staying in the host country,  V o (a,  A a ,  S a ) >  V d (a,  A a ,  S a ) , where  { A a } a= a 0 +1 T and  { S a } a= a 0 +1 T are the se- 
quences of asset and human-capital stocks resulting from 
optimal consumption and location choices. 
117Dustmann and Görlach: The Economics of Temporary Migrations
 migration that take place only if there is a 
period of consumption—or work—in the ori-
gin country after remigration.
One important question that remains is 
who returns and who migrates in the first 
place,18 a point not addressed by the above 
modeling of a single representative indi-
vidual. Our modeling framework is eas-
ily extendable to return-migrant selection; 
for example, in terms of the skills among 
migrants who stay abroad permanently. One 
way to extend the framework would be to 
assume a distribution of skills over the popu-
lation and investigate from which parts emi-
grants from the origin country and return 
migrants are drawn (cf. Borjas and Bratsberg 
1996). In their framework, the selection of 
returnees among a host country’s immigrant 
population depends on the relative returns 
to skills in the two locations, with the skill 
level of return migrants lying between that 
of  nonmigrants and migrants who stay abroad 
permanently. Thus, when emigrants are posi-
tively selected from their home country’s pop-
ulation, returnees will be negatively selected 
among all migrants, and when emigration is 
negatively selective, return migrants will be 
positively selected.19 Although this same out-
come is predicted by the third case discussed 
above, the selection from a distribution of 
skills will be less clear-cut if individuals also 
18 See the extensive literature on migrant selection (e.g. 
the analyses of  Mexico–US migrant selection by Borjas 
1987; Chiquiar and Hanson 2005; McKenzie and Rapoport 
2010; Moraga 2011). This literature, however, focusses on 
selection of migrants from their source country popula-
tion and does not distinguish permanent from temporary 
migrants. 
19 While Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) implicitly assume 
a fixed migration duration for all temporary migrants, 
Dustmann and Görlach (2015) endogenize the time spent 
abroad. They show that in this setting, the migration dura-
tion is a monotonic function of an individual’s skill level. In 
earlier work, Dustmann, Fadlon, and Weiss (2011) use a 
multidimensional Roy model to investigate selective return 
migration (see also Dustmann and Glitz 2011, for a sim-
plified discussion of selective migration in a general Roy 
model setting). 
have a higher preference for consumption in 
their country of origin and if the population 
of immigrants is characterized by a distribu-
tion of preference parameters. 
3.4 Extensions of the Basic Model
Extending our basic model will allow more 
elaborate analyses of temporary migrations 
and provide a building block for stochastic 
and eventually estimable models. Possible 
extensions include changes in preferences 
while residing in a foreign location, habit for-
mation when locations are changed, multiple 
skills with different degrees of transferability 
across countries, active investments in human 
capital, endogenous labor supply, unem-
ployment risk, repeat migrations, borrowing 
constraints, migration costs, and collective 
decision making. In this section, we briefly 
discuss the most pertinent of these possible 
extensions and how they can be implemented.
3.4.1 Habit Formation 
If the preference parameter  π , which 
determines the marginal utility from con-
sumption in the host relative to the home 
country, increases with the time spent in the 
host country because of changing habits and 
assimilation, then the time since immigration 
would have to be included in the state space, 
Ω . Then, in addition to human capital, “habit 
capital” will accumulate as immigrants inte-
grate into their host country’s native society. 
If such accumulation results from an individ-
ual’s choice to actively invest in integration, 
then social capital is accumulated that may, 
in turn, affect both preferences for living in 
the host country and job opportunities (cf. 
Adda, Dustmann, and Görlach 2015).
3.4.2 Multiple Skill Dimensions 
Another simplification adopted in the 
basic model is the assumption of one skill 
dimension,  S , with different prices in the 
two locations. This skill dimension, however, 
is extendable to a Roy model with multiple 
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skill dimensions (Dustmann, Fadlon, and 
Weiss 2011), a  multiskill framework that 
has interesting implications for the way we 
should think about migrations, brain drain, 
and brain gain. In particular, not only may 
different skills have different prices in the 
origin and destination countries, they may 
also accumulate differently, producing emi-
gration and remigration patterns that select 
individuals into the migrant and return 
migrant populations according to their 
innate skill endowments.
3.4.3 Borrowing Constraints 
 Self-employment can be an attractive 
option for many returnees and is a choice 
likely to interact with decisions to migrate in 
the first place (see Dustmann and Kirchkamp 
2002). For example, migration may have 
been chosen in response to borrowing con-
straints by individuals hoping to set up a 
business in their country of origin (Mesnard 
2004; Yang 2006). Individuals who face bor-
rowing constraints that prevent them from 
accumulating the necessary assets to set up 
their own businesses may choose migration 
as a means to accumulate the required ini-
tial capital. In this case,  self-employment 
s would be an additional choice in the 
model set out above, perhaps also as a fur-
ther argument of the utility function so that 
 u o =  u o ( c a , s) . Adjusting the budget con-
straint in the country of origin to reflect 
this extension yields  x A a+1 ≤  (1 + r) x A a + 
 s a  Y s o ( S a ) +  (1 −  s a ) Y e o ( S a ) −  c a  −  I a  , 
with  A a ≥ R , where  R is the borrowing con-
straint and  s a indicates whether the individ-
ual chooses to be  self-employed. Further, let 
 Y s o ( S a ) and  Y e o ( S a ) be the earnings after return 
one can obtain when being  self-employed 
or dependently employed, and let  I a be the 
level of initial investment required to set up 
the business, which is equal to zero once the 
business is set up or if the individual chooses 
not to become  self-employed. Then such a 
scenario corresponds to what Piore (1979) 
labels “target earning,” a factor he considers 
the main motive for temporary migrations. 
This distinction between migration motives 
is important because it implies different indi-
vidual responses to changes in economic con-
ditions. That is, dependent on the relative 
magnitudes of income and substitution effects, 
a change such as an increase in host-country 
wages can have ambiguous effects on optimal 
migration durations in the baseline model 
(see Dustmann 2003). For  borrowing con-
strained target savers, on the other hand, 
for whom the purpose of migration is the 
accumulation of sufficient assets to cover 
investment cost  I a , an increase in host-coun-
try wages will always reduce the time spent 
abroad (Yang 2006; Djajic´ and Vinogradova 
2015). If the returns to accumulated assets 
differ for employed workers versus entrepre-
neurs, with higher returns for the latter (so 
that  r s >  r e ), the budget constraint becomes 
x A a+1  ≤  (1 +  s a   r s  +  (1 −  s a ) r e ) x A a  + 
 s a Y s o ( S a ) + (1 −  s a ) Y e o ( S a ) −  c a −  I a . Then, 
contrary to the former case and the base-
line model without entrepreneurs (where an 
increase in  Y o (S) always shortens migration 
duration), an increase in  r s in the country of 
origin, interpretable as improved investment 
opportunities, has an ambiguous effect on 
the optimal time spent abroad, given higher 
wages and more easily accumulated assets. 
For instance, Lindstrom (1996) finds that 
improvements in investment opportunities in 
the origin communities of Mexican migrants 
to the United States tend to increase migra-
tion durations as asset accumulation becomes 
more valuable. The importance of borrowing 
constraints for migration is emphasized by 
Görlach (2016), who shows that estimates of 
the effect of origin country earnings on migra-
tion dynamics crucially depend on assump-
tions about a migrant’s access to credit.
3.4.4 Household Migration Decisions 
In contrast to our basic model in which 
decisions are made by one individual, some 
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evidence—particularly for developing coun-
tries—suggests that migration decisions are 
frequently made on the household level 
(Stark 1991; Lessem 2013). Such household 
decisions, sometimes taken with the aim 
of reuniting with family, may lead to dif-
ferent remigration patterns. For instance, 
Bijwaard (2010) shows significantly lower 
out-migration hazards for immigrants to 
the Netherlands who immigrated for family 
formation or family reunification reasons, 
as compared to labor or student migrants. 
Poutvaara, Junge, and Munk (2014) doc-
ument far lower out-migration rates from 
Denmark for couples than for either single 
men or women. Likewise, for the United 
States, Van Hook and Zhang (2011) plausi-
bly show out-migration rates to be lowest for 
married immigrants whose spouses reside in 
the United States. Focusing on highly skilled 
individuals from the Pacific region, Gibson 
and McKenzie (2011) document that fam-
ily related determinants of both emigration 
and return migration decisions may well be 
more important than income differentials. 
In line with that, Vadean and Piracha (2010) 
find the decision to migrate repeatedly to be 
strongly affected by marital status. 
Our model can be extended to allow for 
the possibility that migration and  remigration 
decisions are taken in a household frame-
work. For example, if a migrant must finance 
the family in the origin country, a simple 
extension would include a per period utility 
while in the destination country, adjusted to 
include not only the migrant’s consumption 
but also that of family members back home, 
 u d (π,  c a d ,  c a o ) , and possibly the location vec-
tor of other family members. Abstracting 
from the choice of location in which finan-
cial assets will be kept, the budget constraint 
is then extended to  A a+1 ≤  (1 + r) A a + 
 Y d ( S a ) −  c a d − x c a o , possibly also including 
income from other family members. This 
modest extension of the baseline model, 
though likely worthwhile considering in many 
empirical applications, does not change the 
model’s qualitative  implications. In fact, the 
framework can further be extended beyond 
the unitary household setting. Having more 
than one decisionmaker choose his or her 
location in conjunction with, for instance, 
a spouse’s migration decision requires solv-
ing for an equilibrium outcome, which 
tends to be computationally demanding.20 
Approaches taken in the literature to deal 
with this challenge include assumptions 
about  within-household transferable utility 
(Gemici 2011) and categorizations of house-
hold members as primary and secondary 
movers, with the secondary movers condi-
tioning their choice(s) on decisions made by 
the primary mover (Lessem 2013). 
3.4.5 Repeat or Circular Migrations 
It also is possible to extend our focus on 
temporary migrations in which return is 
an absorbing state to other, possibly more 
complex, forms of temporary migrations, 
such as repeat (circular) migrations. In a 
 nonstochastic setting, repeat migration may 
occur if the relative preference for being in 
the destination country,  π , decreases with 
the uninterrupted time spent in that country. 
For instance, long periods away from family 
and home environment may create a cost for 
the migrant that increases with separation, 
but returns to its initial value once the indi-
vidual has spent some time at home, as in 
Nakajima (2014b). In such a case, it might be 
preferable for migrants to split their optimal 
total migration duration into several stays. 
The vector of state variables would then also 
include years since last immigration, and the 
20 See Mincer (1978) for a model describing the inter-
play between family migration and marital stability in 
a static setting. Building on this, Djajic´ (2008) analyzes 
potentially conflicting interests of parents and children 
in their return decisions. An intuitive implication of these 
models is that the probability of all family members staying 
or moving jointly increases with the option of intrahouse-
hold transfers. 
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per period utility in the country of destination 
would be given by  u d (π (ysm),  c a ) . Return to 
the country of origin would then no longer 
be an absorbing state, so that regardless of 
migrant location, his or her value would be 
given by  V L ( Ω a ) = max { V d ( Ω a ) , V o ( Ω a ) } , 
L ∈  {d, o} . We recognize, however, that in 
a stochastic environment, repeat migra-
tions may occur for other reasons, including 
unforeseen events. Moreover, many repeat 
migrations, such as agricultural migrations, 
are likely to be determined by the types 
of jobs available to immigrants. Similar 
to return decisions, repeat migration will 
depend on economic conditions and events 
in the destination country, as well as in the 
migrant’s country of origin.
3.4.6 Risk and Uncertainty
To assess risk and uncertainty, the model 
can be augmented with stochastic terms that 
induce return and possibly repeat migra-
tions. For instance, if unforeseen exchange-
rate fluctuations change the value of 
accumulated savings back in the home coun-
try, they may affect return decisions. Such a 
situation is observed for Filipino migrants by 
Yang (2006), who uses exchange-rate shocks 
during the 1997 Asian crisis to distinguish tar-
get savers from migrants whose return deci-
sions seem driven by classical lifetime utility 
maximization. If such fluctuations reverse 
individual economic prospects, a returned 
migrant may choose to  remigrate. Similarly, 
if an undocumented migrant who optimally 
would have chosen to stay longer is deported, 
that individual may want to  remigrate. In 
our model, return or repeat migrations may 
also be triggered by time-variant locational 
preferences  π or income  Y L (S) , fluctuations 
that also determine the location choices of 
Mexican migrants in the models estimated 
by Colussi (2003), Thom (2010), and Lessem 
(2013). These authors formulate a migrant’s 
decision problem as a dynamic program in a 
framework not too different from ours and 
then use these structural models to predict 
the effect of changes in US border enforce-
ment on migration decisions. 
3.4.7 Legal Constraints, Undocumented 
 Migration, and Border Controls 
If the risk of being prevented from 
entering or staying in a destination country 
increases, perhaps because of stricter visa 
requirements or, in the case of illegal immi-
grants, stricter border controls, it may affect 
the return decisions of immigrants currently 
in the host country.21 For instance, in a 
model of circular migration, a tightening of 
visa requirements or border controls would 
either constitute a cost  C of immigration, so 
that  V o ( Ω a ) = max { V d ( Ω a ) − C, V o ( Ω a ) } , 
or, in the case of illegal migrations, might 
increase the probability  p of being appre-
hended at the border and forced to stay in the 
country of origin, so that  V o ( Ω a ) = p V o ( Ω a ) + 
(1 − p) max { V d ( Ω a ) ,  V o ( Ω a ) } . Importantly, 
many legal migrations take place under tem-
porary visa schemes. If these are binding and 
granted durations of residence are shorter 
than they would be if chosen optimally, for-
ward looking individuals will anticipate the 
risk of not being granted a visa extension 
and adjust their choices accordingly. For 
instance, immigrants expecting a relatively 
short stay in the host country (voluntarily 
or not) will have higher savings and/or send 
more remittances to their home country.
Enforcement directed at undocumented 
immigrants who are already in the host 
country could be modeled as a stochastic 
term denoting migrant deportation irrespec-
tive of the relative magnitudes of  V d ( Ω a ) and 
 V o ( Ω a ) . If such enforcement and the risk of 
being deported imposes a permanent cost  C ̃ 
to utility while in the host country, then  V d ( Ω a ) 
21 Border enforcement may also affect the initial migra-
tion decision, as suggested by Orrenius and Zavodny (2005) 
in a study of the selection of undocumented  Mexico–US 
migrants. 
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=  p ̃   V  o ( Ω a ) +  (1 −  p ̃  ) max { V  d ( Ω a ) − 
 C ̃ (ysm) , V o ( Ω a ) } , where  p ̃ is the probability 
of being deported and  C ̃ varies with years 
since immigration. This cost to utility may, 
for example, be higher for immigrants who 
have just arrived and may lack knowledge 
about the destination country or who have 
yet to establish a secure network. The model 
thus allows analysis of the effect that border 
controls have on the probability of migrants 
returning to their countries of origin. 
Existing analyses of the effect of US border 
enforcement on  Mexico–US migration flows, 
for instance, all find that an increase in US 
border enforcement not only discourages the 
inflow of undocumented Mexican migrants, 
but also increases the average time migrants 
who have crossed the border remain in the 
United States (Thom 2010; Angelucci 2012; 
Lessem 2013). An equilibrium argument 
regarding why a tightening of immigration 
control may lead to a longer stay of earlier 
immigrants is suggested by Greenwood and 
Ward (2015), who investigate the introduc-
tion of US immigration quotas in the 1920s. 
With a reduction of new arrivals, labor-mar-
ket prospects of earlier immigrants improve 
and possibly raise the value of staying in the 
United States
3.4.8 Human Capital and Labor Supply 
Another extension would replace the 
assumption that human capital accumulates 
rather deterministically and only dependent 
on location decisions with a scenario in which 
migrants choose when and how much human 
capital to accumulate. Under that condition, 
if there is uncertainty about future earnings 
or locational preferences (e.g., because of 
uncertain developments in the destination 
or home country), the immigrant’s antici-
pated length of stay in the destination coun-
try would affect human-capital investment 
decisions at any point over the migration 
cycle. Because such anticipated durations 
of stay may change over the  migration 
cycle,  immigrants would  reoptimize their 
investment decisions. Adda, Dustmann, 
and Görlach (2015) develop a model that 
includes endogenous skill accumulation, 
which demonstrates that, for instance, pol-
icies that induce uncertainty about immi-
grants’ chances of remaining permanently in 
the destination country may lead to  ex post 
suboptimal human-capital investment.
Similarly, when labor supply is endoge-
nous, the anticipated time spent in either 
location will be important in choosing 
between leisure and labor supply, see Galor 
and Stark (1991). Hence, whereas in our 
basic model, the planned migration dura-
tion is important for consumption choices, 
this duration will generally influence every 
additional choice allowed for in the model. 
As a result, when migrations are temporary 
and migrants choose the optimal migration 
duration, all other choices will be taken in 
conjunction with their planned duration 
abroad, which obviously introduces consid-
erable complexity and heterogeneity into 
immigrants’ economic decisions. 
3.4.9 Guest Worker Migrations
Many migrations are temporary by defini-
tion; for instance, when migration is firmly 
linked to a particular work contract, such as 
the exchange of financial service providers 
across national borders, teaching or domes-
tic positions in the Middle East, or seasonal 
agricultural work in Europe or the United 
States. In these cases, the optimization prob-
lem simplifies considerably because now the 
length of the migration is predetermined 
and cannot be chosen by the migrant. As a 
result, although decisions in the host country 
continue to be affected by work contract and 
expected economic conditions in the home 
country after return (e.g., wages), the migrant 
will no longer choose the optimal time of 
return because this is now set exogenously. 
When the constraint becomes  binding, it may 
result in  different decisions than in the case 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. LIV (March 2016)122
of an  optimal  migrant-chosen duration. For 
instance, in our first scenario, in which the 
migrant has a preference for consumption in 
the home country (section 3.3.1), the decreas-
ing marginal utility from consumption implies 
that a shorter guest worker contract would 
reduce consumption and increase savings 
during the stay in the host country.
4. Optimal Migration Duration and 
Economic Behavior
4.1 Measuring Migration Durations
Although, as previously stressed, measure-
ment is a major problem for temporary migra-
tion research, even if data were available that 
allowed assessment of migration length, it is 
questionable how useful such information 
would be for assessing the relation between 
immigrants’ economic behavior and migration 
duration. For example, using information on 
completed durations to understand its impact 
on behavior would inherently assume that 
expected durations always equal immigrants’ 
completed durations and that the optimal 
migration duration is the same at any point 
over the migration cycle, which would indeed 
be the case in the deterministic baseline 
model sketched above. Such is unlikely to be 
the case, however, once we introduce stochas-
tic shocks to earnings and preferences into the 
model, as in that case individuals  reoptimize 
and the optimal  remigration decision may 
change over the life cycle. Thus, at different 
stages in their migration history, immigrants 
may condition on different expected migra-
tion durations, meaning that information on 
the length of a completed migration may give 
little indication of planned migration duration 
just after arrival in the host country, when 
immigrants make choices about investments 
in, for example, language acquisition. What 
is needed, rather, is information on intended 
migration duration, which is only available in 
a few surveys. 
To illustrate, we plot the changes in immi-
grants’ return intentions over time in figure 7 
for the United States and for Germany. For 
the United States, we use the two waves of 
the NIS to show the fraction of immigrants 
who intend to stay permanently, conditional 
on having stayed until the second wave (fig-
ure 7, panel A). The longer time span of the 
SOEP allows the fraction to be plotted by 
years since immigration (figure 7, panel B), 
again for the subsample of immigrants who 
are observed throughout the first twenty 
years of their stay. Both parts of the figure 
show a tendency for these immigrant subsa-
mples to revise their migration plans over the 
migration cycle toward a permanent stay.22
4.2 Return Migration and Economic 
Behavior
As already discussed, a temporary, as 
opposed to a permanent, migration affects 
immigrant behavior in virtually every dimen-
sion. For instance, immigrants who intend to 
remain only temporarily in the host country, 
and who will spend the remainder of their 
lives in the origin country, condition any 
present-day choice on expectations about 
their future situation in the country of origin. 
Thus, if wages back home are far lower than 
in the host country, for example, it may lead 
to an intertemporal substitution of leisure 
whose extent may differ between migrants 
dependent on individual expectations or 
length of intended migration. This variation 
introduces heterogeneity into immigrant 
economic behavior that depends on vari-
ables that may be difficult to measure and 
thus have consequences for such empirical 
work as analyses of life cycle wage profiles or 
estimations of labor supply elasticities. 
22 This observation cannot, of course, be shown for 
entire immigrant cohorts, as those who revise their 
intended length of stay downwards are more likely to select 
out of the observed samples. 
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In fact, Dustmann (1993), seeking to 
explain why the earnings paths of immigrants 
to Germany were flatter than those of immi-
grants to the United States (see Chiswick 
1978; Long 1980; Borjas 1985), emphasized 
early on that immigrants’ human-capital 
investments and ensuing assimilation profiles 
may depend on migration duration. In par-
ticular, he demonstrated that the nature of 
the migration—whether permanent or tem-
porary—may have an important impact on 
the earnings growth that should be seen in 
immigrant populations. Drawing on the key 
insight that the incentive for any investment 
in skills depends on the length of the  payoff 
period for that investment ( Ben-Porath 
1967), he suggested that immigrants, if they 
intend to remain only temporarily in the des-
tination country, are likely to invest less in 
the type of human capital that is productive 
in the destination country, but has little value 
in the origin country (e.g., language skills). In 
later work, using unique survey information 
on immigrants’ intended migration duration 
and instrumenting this variable with unfore-
seen events (e.g., family deaths in the home 
country), Dustmann (1999) demonstrates 
that those with nonpermanent intentions do 
indeed invest less in language capital. He 
further shows that female migrants whose 
husbands intend to return have higher 
labor-market participation rates, which is 
compatible with an intertemporal substitu-
tion of leisure (Dustmann 1997a). Bellemare 
(2007), using a dynamic life-cycle model 
in which accumulated working experience 
affects both wages and locational preferences, 
refines this finding, showing that restricting 
migration duration reduces the participation 
of  low-skilled migrants to Germany but has 
little effect on  high-skilled immigrants. 
Cortes (2004), on the other hand, by com-
paring the outcomes for economic migrants 
and refugees in the United States with the 
assumption that the latter expect to stay 
longer and thus have stronger incentives 
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Figure 7. Fraction Intending to Stay Permanently Over Time
Notes: (a) legal immigrants in the United States aged 18–64 who arrived at age 16 or older. (b) immigrants in 
Germany aged 18–64 who arrived at age 16 or older. Grey lines show the 95 percent confidence bounds of the 
fitted local polynomial regression line.
Sources: New Immigrant Survey (2003/2004 and 2007–2009); Socio-economic Panel, 1984–2012. 
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for  postimmigration human-capital invest-
ment, identifies a positive effect of expected 
migration duration on wages. Khan (1997), 
using a similar argument, finds higher 
 postimmigration investment in education 
among refugee migrants to the United States, 
relative to economic migrants. Similarly, 
Dustmann (2008) shows that among sec-
ond-generation immigrants to Germany, 
the intention by  foreign-born fathers to stay 
permanently increases the probability of 
their sons’ attaining upper secondary school-
ing. This latter implies that human-capital 
investment decisions may also be affected by 
return plans in an intergenerational setting 
in which parental investments in children 
depend on where parents believe their chil-
dren will be living in the future. To the extent 
that immigrant parents expect their children 
to be better off in the host country—either 
because the latter are socially better inte-
grated there than in their parents’ country 
of birth, or because of an expected intergen-
erational upward mobility—the presence of 
children may defer a return migration. On 
the other hand, parents with a strong attach-
ment to their home country may want their 
children to be raised and educated in their 
parents’ cultural environment, and may thus 
be more likely to return. 
There is also evidence of a positive asso-
ciation between immigrant return plans and 
savings and remittance decisions, as shown 
by Merkle and Zimmermann (1992) for 
immigrants in Germany based on the SOEP. 
Pinger (2010), using a household survey that 
also collects information on current and for-
mer household members living abroad, offers 
similar evidence for migrants from Moldova. 
Likewise, Dustmann and Mestres (2010a) 
show that immigrants who plan to remain 
only temporarily in Germany have higher 
remittances than migrants who plan to stay 
permanently and are more likely to transfer 
their assets to the origin country (Dustmann 
and Mestres 2010b). In a  comparison with 
German households, Bauer and Sinning 
(2011) reveal that although immigrant house-
holds save less on average, temporary migrants 
have a higher savings rate than natives once 
remittances are taken into account. 
As the above discussion suggests, even 
though much of the literature continues 
to treat economic outcomes as exogenous 
determinants for out-migration decisions, 
there is now considerable evidence that many 
outcomes are affected by expected migration 
duration. Most of the extant work, however, 
depends on return plans reported in sur-
veys and models the relation between return 
plans and economic outcomes in a reduced-
form setting. Not only may it be overly sim-
plistic to assume that economic outcomes are 
exogenous with respect to migration dura-
tion, but return migration intentions in turn 
may change over the immigrants’ migration 
cycle because of shocks to wages and pref-
erences. Capturing these changes requires 
that economic behavior and return plans be 
modeled in conjunction. To do this, several 
recent papers use frameworks similar to 
ours. These studies include Deléchat (2001), 
Colussi (2003), Thom (2010), Rendon and 
Cuecuecha (2010), Lessem (2013) and 
Nakajima (2014a, 2014b) for  Mexican–US 
migration, and Bellemare (2007), van Baalen 
and Müller (2008), and Kırdar (2012) for 
Germany (all based on SOEP data). 
5. Temporary Migrations and Their 
Implications for Host and Home Countries
Because immigrants who plan only a 
restricted stay in the destination country 
adjust their investment in human and social 
capital accordingly, migration temporariness 
has effects beyond the individual immigrant. 
For example, these immigrants’ flatter earn-
ings profiles and lower investment in lan-
guage skills or networking may reinforce 
segregation in the host country and result 
in their contributing below their economic 
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potential. Return plans may also affect immi-
grants’ investments in their children and 
impact savings and consumption choices. 
There are also consequences for the sending 
country: immigrants who intend to return 
home may not bring their families with them, 
but instead make higher remittances, or they 
may return with knowledge or initiatives that 
aid development in their country of origin. 
In this section, we briefly examine such con-
sequences and review related analyses. 
5.1 Consequences of Temporary Migrations 
for the Sending Country
5.1.1 Remittances
The arguably most important channel by 
which migration affects individuals who stay 
behind in the origin country is via remit-
tances, whose impacts are the subject of a 
large body of literature (see Rapoport and 
Docquier 2006, and Yang 2011, for sur-
veys). The focus of such studies ranges from 
effects on nonmigrant family members’ 
labor supply (Rodriguez and Tiongson 2001; 
 Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006) to sub-
jective well-being (Gibson and McKenzie 
2014), and the aggregate effects on the 
wider economy (Durand et al. 1996; Taylor 
and Wyatt 1996; Taylor 1999; di Giovanni, 
Levchenko, and Ortega 2015). Dustmann 
and Mestres (2010a), defining remittances as 
“all transfers from the immigration country 
to the immigrant’s home country,” distinguish 
three primary motives for such transmis-
sions, each likely to be affected by migration 
temporariness: support for remaining family 
members, savings for future consumption or 
investments held in the origin country, and 
insurance against a future return. The first 
motive is likely to be more common in tem-
porary migrations because in these cases, 
immigrants are more likely to leave their 
families behind (see Funkhouser 1995, for a 
simple model of this remittance motive). As 
regards the second, Dustmann and Mestres 
(2010b) show that temporary migrants are 
more likely to hold assets in their home 
countries. In terms of remittance as insur-
ance, migrants planning to return at some 
future time may contribute to the home 
community in order to “pay their way” back 
in. This remittance motive may also serve as 
an insurance mechanism for migrants who 
currently do not plan to return. For instance, 
Batista and Umblijs (2014), in an analysis of 
the relation between risk aversion and remit-
tances among immigrants in Ireland, find 
that both more  risk-averse individuals and 
individuals with higher wage risks are more 
likely to remit, possibly to ensure a welcome 
back home if their migration must be termi-
nated. Such transfers may have important 
consequences for the home community.23 
To illustrate the importance of taking into 
account expected migration duration at the 
time decisions are made, we consider the 
remittance behavior of immigrants to the 
United States and to Germany, as sampled 
by the NIS and SOEP, respectively. Panel 
A of figure 8 depicts remittance profiles by 
years of schooling separately for immigrants 
who report an intention to stay in the United 
States only temporarily and those who plan 
to stay permanently. The figure clearly shows 
that highly educated immigrants who intend 
to stay permanently remit less on average 
than those planning to leave and  presumably 
23 A number of papers attempt to disentangle differ-
ent remittance motives, including Lucas and Stark (1985) 
using data from Botswana, whose results do not support 
altruism (defined as utility from consumption of family 
members) as the sole cause of remittances. Similarly, Cox, 
Eser, and Jimenez (1998) find that remittances received 
by Peruvian households increase with  pre-transfer income, 
contradicting the pure altruism hypothesis. Faini (1994), 
however, identifies a negative relation between remit-
tances sent by  foreign-born workers in Germany and 
recipients’ incomes as predicted by an altruistic remittance 
motive. Likewise, Agarwal and Horowitz (2002), who test 
altruism against a  risk-sharing motive, find evidence for the 
altruistic explanation. 
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return to their communities of origin.24 A 
similar pattern emerges for immigrants to 
Germany (see panel B of figure 8), although 
of course, the relation in the figures is merely 
suggestive, rather than causal.
5.1.2 Brain Drain and Brain Gain
One issue that has received much contro-
versial attention in the economic literature 
is brain drain through emigration, a context 
in which return migration has been used as 
one argument to support the possibility that 
 high-skilled emigration can also lead to a 
brain gain (see Docquier and Rapoport 2012, 
and Hatton 2014). For example, Domingues, 
Dos Santos, and  Postel-Vinay (2003) formu-
late a theoretical model in which return-
ing migrants contribute to the overall skill 
endowment of their home country, leaving 
a potentially positive overall effect even 
when the initial emigration from the source 
24 See also Bollard et al. (2011) for a detailed discussion 
of highly educated migrants’ remittance behavior from a 
number of destination countries. 
 country is positively selected. In their model, 
permanent  high-skilled emigration has an 
unambiguously negative effect on the origin 
country. In an extension, they assume that 
a migration is temporary with a probability 
determined by the host country’s govern-
ment—and thus not a migrant choice—and 
allow for endogenous human-capital invest-
ment prior to emigration (Domingues, Dos 
Santos, and  Postel-Vinay 2004). In this set-
ting, an increase in the fraction of temporary 
visas has two opposing effects on the sending 
country’s skill endowment; that is, whereas a 
decrease in the expected time spent in the 
destination country, with higher returns to 
human capital, reduces migrants’ incentives 
to invest in education, a larger number of 
returning migrants and the related diffusion 
of knowledge increase the sending country’s 
overall human capital. This aspect is also 
addressed by Dustmann, Fadlon, and Weiss 
(2011), who point out that in the absence of 
externalities, individual rationality implies 
that the reduction in local output caused 
by emigration is always lower than the gain 
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Figure 8. Annual Remittances Conditional on Having Remitted by Intention to Stay Permanently
Notes: (a) legal immigrants in the United States aged 18–64 who arrived at age 16 or older. (b) immigrants in 
Germany aged 18–64 who arrived at age 16 or older. Grey lines show the 95 percent confidence bounds of the 
fitted local polynomial regression line.
Sources: New Immigrant Survey (2003/2004); Socio-economic Panel, 2000–2012. 
127Dustmann and Görlach: The Economics of Temporary Migrations
obtained by immigrants abroad. Defining a 
reduction in the per capita human capital 
in the home country as a brain drain and an 
increase as a brain gain, emigration will lead 
to a brain drain or brain gain based on the 
type of individuals who emigrate. In their 
 two-dimensional skill model, however, a 
brain drain resulting from  high-skilled emi-
gration may be mitigated and even reversed 
by returning migrants if their skills are highly 
valued in the origin country. 
Such “brain circulation” resulting from 
return migration does indeed seem to be an 
important aspect that should be considered 
in any brain drain analysis. The extent to 
which it benefits sending countries, however, 
depends on the tendency of highly skilled 
migrants from these countries to return, with 
considerable heterogeneity across source 
countries. For instance, Rosenzweig (2008), 
using the US NIS pilot and Occupational 
Wages around the World (OWW) data-
base to investigate the determinants of for-
eign student return decisions in the United 
States, shows that higher skill prices in ori-
gin countries lead to higher return rates. 
His results also indicate that, conditional on 
 skill-prices, Asian students are among the 
most likely to return. Finally, return migrants 
may shape their home country’s institutions. 
Spilimbergo (2009) presents support for a 
positive association between the number of 
student migrants at academic institutions 
in democratic countries and the quality of 
institutions in their countries of origin, while 
there is no such association for students in 
 nondemocratic host countries. 
5.2 Consequences of Temporary Migrations 
for the Receiving Country
Among the obvious consequences of 
migration temporariness for receiving coun-
tries is the tendency for temporary migrants 
to invest less in their host country’s specific 
human capital than permanent migrants, 
while still tending to save and sometimes 
remit more. These tendencies affect the 
contributions made to the receiving coun-
try in terms of taxes and productivity. On 
the other hand, temporary migrants tend to 
spend their most productive years in the host 
country, while spending costly childhood and 
retirement years in the country of origin.
5.2.1 Fiscal Impact
Although a multitude of studies assess the 
net fiscal contribution of immigrants to their 
host country’s finances (see e.g., Smith and 
Edmonston 1997; Auerbach and Oreopoulos 
1999; Lee and Miller 2000; Storesletten 
2000, for the United States; and Dustmann 
and Frattini 2014, for the United Kingdom), 
most do not distinguish temporary from per-
manent immigrants, even though the fiscal 
position of each can be expected to differ. 
On the one hand, as previously discussed, 
temporary immigrants may have flatter earn-
ings profiles than permanent immigrants, 
meaning they pay lower income taxes. They 
may also, however, consume less (and remit 
more) and thus pay less in indirect taxes. On 
the other hand, some or even most of the 
high fiscal burden during old age may be 
borne by the country in which the migrants 
settle after retirement. 
Storesletten (2000) incorporates this latter 
point into an overlapping generation model, 
which is calibrated to reflect the structure 
of immigration to the United States. Using 
out-migration rates,  postmigration  take-up 
rates of social benefits, and other param-
eters based on estimates from the litera-
ture, he finds that the net present value of 
 high-skilled immigrants’ fiscal contribution 
would be lower in a scenario without out-mi-
gration if these immigrants arrived at ages 
close to retirement. For younger immigrants, 
the opposite is true. Nevertheless, because 
he assumes that out-migration is random, 
even across age groups, Storesletten ignores 
selection and abstracts from  temporary 
immigrants having different career paths 
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than permanent immigrants. Kırdar (2012), 
in contrast, endogenizes out-migration in a 
dynamic structural model more similar to 
that outlined in section 3, which he estimates 
using data from the SOEP. By quantifying 
the effect of immigration on host countries’ 
insurance systems, he shows that taking the 
endogeneity of return decisions into account 
increases the net expected gain to the host 
country’s finances because negatively selec-
tive out-migration implies that the migrants 
most prone to be beneficiaries are likely to 
return first. 
Findings on the fiscal impact of immi-
gration are summarized in a recent OECD 
(2013) report, which emphasizes the 
important differences between  native-born 
populations and immigrants in general or 
temporary immigrants in particular.25 For 
example, the report notes that, compared 
to the  working-age population, the average 
annual social expenditure in OECD coun-
tries is more than twice as high for children 
and almost six times as high for individuals 
over sixty-five, which has important impli-
cations for assessing the fiscal position of 
temporary migrants. Nevertheless, among 
OECD members, Australia is the only coun-
try that provides official estimates of immi-
grants’ fiscal contributions, drawing mostly 
on the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants 
in Australia (LSIA) and a model that—
although not a  life-cycle model—reflects 
immigrants’ fiscal position by visa category 
over a  twenty-year period. Not surprisingly, 
the model predicts a strong positive contri-
bution for temporary business migrants. For 
instance, the 87,000 immigrants in this visa 
category who arrived during  2006–07 stayed 
an average of two years and contributed an 
estimated one-billion-plus Australian dollars 
during their first year of stay, with almost 
25 See also Kerr and Kerr (2011) for a recent survey 
of this literature, and Preston (2013) for some theoretical 
considerations on the fiscal impacts of immigration. 
half a billion dollars per year contributed 
by those who stayed more than two years 
(Access Economics, 2008).
5.2.2 Other Consequences
The aforementioned studies treat taxa-
tion and redistributive policies as exogenous. 
However, such policies may be themselves 
endogenous, giving rise to interesting politi-
cal-economy issues. Abstracting from poten-
tial wage effects, Freeman (1986) argues 
that in a  laissez-faire state, temporary immi-
gration programs should be uncontroversial 
across different interest groups (see also 
Freeman 2006), while in a welfare state, 
redistributive issues may lead to differences 
between governments and employers in how 
restrictive policies, even regarding tempo-
rary migration, should be. Ortega (2010) 
discusses a model in which native workers 
of a given skill group, when voting on immi-
gration and redistributive policies,  trade off 
lower current wages due to immigration of 
substitute workers against future political 
support for their preferred redistributive 
policy if immigrants or their children can 
acquire the right to vote and policy prefer-
ences are homogeneous within skill groups. 
He shows that in the presence of intergen-
erational upward mobility,  long-run support 
for a welfare state can be maintained under 
ius solis, i.e., if the children of immigrants 
acquire citizenship and thus voting rights, 
but not under ius sanguinis (if second gen-
eration immigrants stay in the host country, 
but without voting rights) or if migration is 
temporary. Beyond the direct effects on a 
host country’s finances, the form of immigra-
tion may thus have implications for choices 
of host-country populations, hence on policy 
parameters themselves.
Many other implications of temporary 
versus permanent migrations for the receiv-
ing country follow directly from the behav-
ioral differences between the two types. For 
instance, as Adda, Dustmann, and Görlach 
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(2015) point out, temporary migrants may 
invest less in social capital, which has poten-
tial consequences for their social assimilation 
and the segregation of immigrant communi-
ties. A host country’s optimal immigration 
system thus also depends on its society’s 
taste for cultural diversity (Jain, Majumdar, 
and Mukand 2016).One straightforward con-
tribution to the extant literature on migra-
tion’s trade enhancing effect26 is Jansen and 
Piermartini’s (2009) gravity-style regres-
sion of bilateral trade flows with the United 
States, which includes proxies for the num-
bers of both temporary and permanent immi-
grants from the respective trading partners. 
These authors’ results indicate that tempo-
rary migrants play a larger role than perma-
nent migrants in fostering both imports and 
exports with their origin countries, which 
suggests that the probably lower integration 
of temporary migrants in the United States 
may be compensated for by better knowl-
edge of the home country market through 
stronger links these migrants maintain with 
their home societies.
Temporary migrations are also likely to 
affect wages and employment of natives in 
destination countries differently from per-
manent migrations. The large literature on 
the labor-market effects of immigration is 
largely static and focuses on immediate wage 
and employment effects.27 However, in the 
longer run, immigrants are likely to move up 
the distribution of native wages, and impose, 
26 A number of papers show a positive relation between 
international migrant stocks and bilateral trade flows 
without distinguishing permanent and temporary immi-
grants (see, e.g., Gould 1994; Rauch and Trindade 2002; 
Herander and Saavedra 2005; Combes, Lafourcade, and 
Mayer 2015). 
27 See, e.g., Card (1990, 2001, 2009); Altonji and 
Card (1991); Borjas (2003); Aydemir and Borjas (2007); 
Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012); Ottaviano 
and Peri (2012); Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013); 
and Piyapromdee (2014); to name just a few. A study that 
explicitly considers employment effects of a temporary 
worker program is Gross and Schmitt (2012). 
therefore, supply shocks on natives at other 
parts of the wage distribution than at their 
initial position, giving rise to an interest-
ing dynamic of wage effects. According to 
our previous discussion, the pace by which 
immigrants move through the native wage 
distribution may partly depend on the tem-
porariness of their duration. Out-migration 
will also lead to negative labor-supply shocks, 
in the same way that immigration leads to 
positive labor-supply shocks. Again, how 
that affects native wages will depend on who 
emigrates and where emigrants are located 
along the native wage distribution.
A continuing supply of low cost temporary 
foreign workers may also induce employers 
to reduce capital accumulation and move 
toward labor-intensive production technolo-
gies. This may have negative effects on the 
marginal productivity of labor. Borjas (2009) 
adds another aspect, by highlighting the 
importance of remittances on labor-market 
outcomes in a general equilibrium setting. 
He argues that a reduction in aggregate 
demand due to higher remittances of immi-
grants will affect native wages negatively. 
Although he does not distinguish between 
different forms of migration, it follows from 
our discussion above that remittances may 
be higher when migrations are temporary. 
However, as yet, empirical evidence of these 
secondary effects of temporariness of migra-
tions for receiving economies is scarce and 
leaves much room for future research.
6. Conclusions and Outlook
Although migration temporariness induces 
behaviors that differ from those of perma-
nent migrants, it is typically not considered 
in analyses of immigrant behavior and immi-
gration’s impact on home and host countries. 
We argue that this omission may be serious: 
many migration phenomena can only be fully 
understood when models allow immigrants 
to choose the optimal migration duration 
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and consider the dynamic implications for 
immigrant behavior. 
To this end, we propose a general dynamic 
framework that allows analysis of immigrant 
behavior under different assumptions about 
reasons and motives for return. This model 
can be extended in different directions to 
investigate the behavioral consequences of 
temporary migrations, making it a potentially 
useful starting point for researchers wishing 
to study temporary migrations and their con-
sequences. We illustrate the model’s flexibil-
ity by suggesting several possible extensions 
and discussing the few existing papers that 
explore these avenues.
One major reason for the paucity of 
research on migration temporariness, we 
believe, is the lack of appropriate data. In 
recent years, however, considerable prog-
ress has been made on this front, resulting in 
higher-quality data not only from better-de-
signed surveys, but also from the linking of 
administrative data sources and the com-
bination of administrative and survey data. 
Such datasets promise to enhance research 
progress in this important field and to 
improve our understanding of immigration 
and its consequences. Within this context, 
the framework proposed in this study may 
serve as a valuable instrument for analyzing 
more complex forms of migrations.
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